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A  common  observation  in  experiments  involving  finite  repetition  of  the  prisoners’ 
dilemma  is  that  players  do  not  always  play  the  single-period  dominant  strategies 
(“finking”),  but  instead  achieve  some  measure  of  cooperation.  Yet  finking  at  each 
stage  is  the  only  Nash  equilibrium  in  the  finitely  repeated  game.  We  show  here  how 
incomplete  information  about  one  or  both  players’  options,  motivation  or  behavior 
can  explain  the  observed  cooperation.  Specifically,  we  provide  a  bound  on  the 
number  of  rounds  at  which  Fink  may  be  played,  when  one  player  may  possibly  be 
committed  to  a  “Tit-for-Tat”  strategy.  Journal  of  Economic  Literature 
Classification  Numbers:  026,  213. 
The  purpose of  this note is to  demonstrate how reputation  effects due to 
informational  asymmetries can  generate  cooperative  behavior  in  finitely 
repeated versions of  the classic prisoners’ dilemma. The methods employed 
are  those developed in  our  work  on  the  chain-store  paradox  (Kreps  and 
Wilson  [2],  Milgrom  and Roberts [4]).  We  refer the reader to  those papers 
for  motivation,  formal definitions,  and interpretation. 
The  basic game that  we consider consists  of N  repetitions of  the following 
two  person. bimatrix,  stage game: 
COL 
ROW  Fink  Cooperate 
Fink  030 
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We  require  a >  1,  b <  0,  and  a +  b <  2. ’  At  each  stage,  each  of  the  two 
players,  ROW  and  COL,  recalls  his  previous  actions  and  is  informed  about 
those  of  his  opponent.  The  players  move  simultaneously  at  each  stage. 
Payoffs  in  the  overall  game  are  the  (undiscounted)  sums  of  the  stage  payoffs. 
This  game  has  a  unique  Nash  equilibrium  path,  which  involves  each 
player  choosing  to  fink  at  every  stage.  The  logic  is  similar  to  Selten’s 
backwards  induction  in  the  chain-store  game  (although  the  argument  there 
shows  the  uniqueness  of  the  perfect  equilibrium).  In  the  final  stage  (which  we 
call  stage  l),  finking  strongly  dominates  cooperating,  and  so  must  ensue. 
Then,  in  the  penultimate  stage,  finking  does  better  than  cooperating  in  terms 
of  the  current  stage,  while  the  choice  at  this  stage  cannot  affect  the  outcome 
in  stage  1. Thus  finking  will  again  be  adopted  by  both  players.  And  so  on, 
for  any  finite  N.’  This  outcome  is  clearly  and  dramatically  inefficient. 
This  uniqueness  result  is  disturbing  in  light  of  experiments  with  this  game, 
of  which  there  have  been  a very  large  number.  (See  Axelrod  [ 1 ]  and  Smale 
[5]  for  references.)  A  common  pattern  in  these  experiments  is  that,  at  least 
for  some  time,  both  players  cooperate  and,  in  the  process,  end  up  with 
payoffs  that  are  strictly  greater  than  they  would  obtain  under  equilibrium 
play.  The  issue  then  is  whether  this  puzzle  can  be  resolved  in  the  context  of 
rational,  self-interested  behavior.  The  approach  we  adopt  is  to  admit  a 
“small  amount”  of  the  “right  kind”  of  incomplete  information. 
In  fact,  we  are  able  to  show  that  certain  kinds  of  informational  asym- 
metries  must  yield  a  significant  measure  of  cooperation  in  equilibrium,  and 
that  other  plausible  asymmetries  may  produce  cooperation  as  well. 
Throughout,  the  equilibrium  concept  is  that  of  sequential  equilibrium  (Kreps 
and  Wilson  [ 31).  Sequential  equilibrium  in  a game  of  incomplete  information 
requires  that  the  action  taken  by  any  player  at  any  point  in  the  game  tree 
must  be  part  of  an  optimal  strategy  from  that  point  forward,  given  his  beliefs 
about  the  evolution  of  the  game  to  this  point  (which  must,  to  the  extent 
possible,  be  consistent  with  Bayesian  updating  on  the  hypothesis  that  the 
equilibrium  strategies  have  been  used  to  date)  and  given  that  future  play  will 
be  governed  by  the  equilibrium  strategies.  The  various  models  we  use 
parallel  those  in  [2,4].  Each  involves  some  element  of  uncertainty  in  the 
mind  of  (at  least)  one  player  about  the  other,  and  they  can  all  be viewed  in 
terms  of  a lack  of  common  knowledge  (between  ROW  and  COL)  that  both 
‘If  a  +  b  >  2,  then  the  strategy  of  both  cooperating  at  each  stage  is  Pareto-dominated  by 
alternating  between  tinkxooperate  and  cooperate-fink.  Much  of  our  analysis  can  be  adapted 
to  handle  this  case. 
2 Note  the  sharp  contrast  with  the  infinitely  repeated  case,  where  any  average  payoff  vector 
in  the  intersection  of  the  positive  orthant  and  the  convex  hull  of  the  four  possible  stage  payoff 
vectors  can  be  achieved  through  a  perfect  equilibrium.  Note  also  that  in  the  finitely  repeated 
case,  Nash  equilibrium  behavior  off  the  equilibrium  path  may  involve  some  cooperation.  But 
finking  is  required  everywhere  in  any  perfect  equilibrium. PRISONERS’  DILEMMA  247 
are  rational  players  playing  precisely  the  game  specified  above.  The 
possibilities  for  more  detailed  analysis  of  this  model  and  its  application  in 
economic,  political,  and  military  contexts  appear  to  be  very  rich.  Various 
combinations  of  the  authors  hope  to  report  on  such  work  in  the  future. 
Model  1:  ROW  Might  Play  Tit-for-Tat 
The  first  approach  we  consider  supposes  that,  when  the  game  begins,  one 
of  the  players  (say  COL)  is  not  absolutely  certain  that  the  other  (ROW)  will 
play  “rationally”  according  to  the payoffs  specified  above.  Specifically,  COL 
assigns  probability  1 -  6  to  the  possibility  of  a “rational”  opponent,  and  he 
allows  a (very  small)  chance,  6, that  ROW  has  available  only  the  Tit-for-Tat 
strategy.3  The  Tit-for-Tat  strategy  requires  the  player  using  it  to  begin  by 
cooperating  and  then  to  cooperate  at  stage  n -  1 if  and  only  if  his  opponent 
cooperated  at  the  preceding  stage,  II.  It  is  worth  noting  that  this  strikingly 
simple  and  quite  natural  strategy  emerged  as  the  winner  in  Axelrod’s 
prisoners’  dilemma  tournament  [ 11. 
To  present  a  sequential  equilibrium  in  full  detail  for  this  game  is  difficult. 
There  is  no  question  that  such  equilibria  exist:  See  Kreps  and  Wilson 
[  3, Prop.  11. But  the  “end  play”  of  such  equilibria  are  very  complex.  So we 
shall  be content  here  to  prove  that  in  any  sequential  equilibrium,  the  number 
of  stages  where  one  player  or  the  other  finks  is  bounded  above  by  a constant 
depending  on  6  but  independent  of  N.  Further,  if  we  restrict  attention  to 
sequential  equilibria  that  are  not  Pareto-dominated  by  any  other  sequential 
equilibria,  then  there  is  cooperation  in  all but  the  last  “few”  stages. 
We  prove  these  statements  in  a  number  of  steps.  The  statement  of  each 
step  except  the  last  should  be prefaced:  In  every  sequential  equilibrium... 
Step  1.  .  ..if  it  becomes  common  knowledge4  before  some  stage  that 
ROW  is  rational,  then  both  ROW  and  COL  fink  at  this  and  every 
succeeding  stage,  and  their  payoffs  from  the  remainder  of  the  game  are  zero. 
The  proof  is  by  induction  on  the  number  of  stages  remaining.  It  is 
apparent  if  there  is  only  one  stage  remaining.  Suppose  that  it  is  true  if  there 
‘An  alternative way  to  model  this  is  to  assume  that  ROW  has  available  all  the  strategies 
above,  but  that  with  probability  6,  ROW’s  payoffs  are  not  as  above  but  rather  make  playing 
Tit-for-Tat  strongly  dominant.  The  results  given  below  can  be  proved  for  this  alternative 
model,  although  the  simple  “common  knowledge”  arguments  that  we  use  are  no  longer 
available,  and  slightly  more  complex  arguments  are  required.  An  advantage  of  this  alternative 
model  is  that  it  eases  interpretation  of  the  probability  assessed  by  COL  that  ROW  is  the  Tit- 
for-Tat  player  as  ROW’s  “reputation.” 
*It  is  common  knowledge  that  ROW  is  rational  if  both  players  know  this,  both  know  that 
both  know  this,  ad  infinitum.  More  formally,  an  event  E  is  common  knowledge  between  two 
individuals  at  a  state  w  E  R  if  there  is  some  A  in  the  finest  common  coarsening  (meet)  of  their 
information  partitions  with  w  E  A  c  E.  The  crucial  role  of  common  knowledge  will  be 
illustrated  shortly. 248  KREPS  ET  AL. 
are  n -  1 or  fewer  stages  to  go.  Then  with  n  stages  remaining,  the  rational 
ROW  must  foresee  that  his  present  choice  of  action  cannot  influence  the 
future  course  of  the  game,  since  it  will  remain  common  knowledge  that  he is 
rational  when  stage  n -  1 arrives.  Therefore  he  will  maximize  his  immediate 
payoff,  which  means  linking.  Similarly,  COL  anticipates  that  no  matter  what 
he  does  at  this  stage,  finking  will  occur  at  all  later  stages.  In  this  round, 
finking  is  strictly  better,  so  COL  finks  as  well.  Since  both  sides  fink,  their 
payoffs  are  each  zero,  and  the  induction  is  complete. 
Step  2.  .  ..if  COL  links  at  stage  n +  1, then  ROW  finks  at  stage  n  with 
probability  one. 
If  ROW  did  cooperate  in  these  circumstances,  it  would  become  common 
knowledge  that  he  was  rational.  (The  “Tit-for-Tat”  ROW  does  not  have  this 
action  available.)  Thus  cooperation  nets  zero  in  the  continuation  game.  But 
linking  can  do  no  worse  than  zero  in  the  continuation  game  and  it  is  strictly 
dominant  in  the  stage  game.  Thus  finking  does  strictly  better  overall.  This 
means  that  ROW  must  link  with  probability  one. 
Step  3.  .  ..starting  from  any  point  in  the  game  tree  (i),  where  COL 
assesses  probability  q  that  ROW  is  the  Tit-for-Tat  player,  (ii),  where  there 
are  n  stages  to  go,  and  (iii),  where  COL  cooperated  on  the  previous  stage, 
the  expected  payoff  to  COL  for  the  remainder  of  the  game  is  at  least  qn  +  b. 
To  show  this,  consider  the  strategy  for  COL  of  cooperating  until  the  next 
time  that  ROW  finks,  and  then  finking  ever  after.  Against  the  Tit-for-Tat 
player,  this  yields  a  payoff  of  n.  Against  the  rational  ROW,  it  yields  no 
worse  than  b.  Thus  it  yields  an  expected  payoff  that  is  at  least 
qn +  (1  -4)  b >  qn +  b,  and  any  equilibrium  strategy  must  do  at  least  as 
well. 
Step  4.  .:.starting  from  any  point  in  the  game  tree  (i),  where  COL 
assesses  probability  q  that  ROW  is  the  Tit-for-Tat  player,  (ii),  where  there 
are  n  stages  to  go,  and  (iii),  where  COLfinked  on  the  previous  stage,  the 
expected  payoff  to  COL  for  the  remainder  of  the  game  is  at  least 
q(n-  1)+26. 
Because  ROW  is  sure  to  fink  (see  step  2),  COL  knows  that  his  assessment 
in  the  subsequent  stage  will  again  be q. So by  cooperating  at this  stage,  COL 
gets  b  immediately  and  at  least  q(n  -  1)  +  b  in  the  continuation  game.  His 
overall  expected  payoff  can  be  no  worse  than  the  sum  of  these,  or 
q(n-1)+2b. 
Step  5.  . ..starting  at  a  point  in  the  game  tree  (i),  where  COL  assesses 
probability  q that  ROW  is  the  Tit-for-Tat  player,  and  (ii),  where  there  are  n 
stages  to  go,  the  expected  payoff  to  the  rational  ROW  player  is  no  less  than 
q(n-  1)+3b-a. PRISONERS’  DILEMMA  249 
Note  first  that  COL  will  do  no  worse  if  the  rational  ROW  plays  Tit-for- 
Tat  than  if  the  rational  ROW  plays  his  equilibrium  strategy.  This  is  easily 
verified  inductively,  using  steps  (1)  and  (2).  Thus  the  bounds  obtained  in 
steps  (3)  and  (4)  apply  equally  well  if  the  rational  ROW  were  to  play  Tit- 
for-Tat.  And  by  playing  Tit-for-Tat,  the  rational  ROW  nets  within  b -  a  of 
whatever  COL  gets,  path  by  path.  This  gives  us  the  bound  on  ROW’s  payoff 
stated  above. 
Step  6.  .  ..if  COL  assesses  probability  q  that  ROW  is  the  Tit-for-Tat 
player,  and  if  there  are  more  than  (2a  -  4b  +  2q)/q  stages  left  to  go,  then 
ROW  plays  the  Tit-for-Tat  strategy  with  probability  one.  Thus  along  the 
equilibrium  path,  until  the  first  stage  less  than  (2~  -  46 +  26)/d,  COL  infers 
nothing  from  the  observed  behavior  of  ROW,  and  COL’s  assessment  that 
ROW  is  the  Tit-for-Tat  player  remains  at  6. 
In  light  of  Step  2, all that  is  needed  here  is  to  show  that  ROW  cooperates 
if  COL  has  just  cooperated  in  these  circumstances.  (The  second  part  of  the 
statement  follows  trivially  from  the  first.)  If  ROW  were  to  fink,  it  would 
become  common  knowledge  that  ROW  is  rational.  Thus  the  total  payoff 
from  finking  cannot  exceed  a-ROW  gets  at  most  a  immediately  (if  COL 
cooperates)  and  then  zero  in  the  continuation  game  (by  Step  1)).  By 
cooperating,  ROW  will  do  no  worse  than  b in this  round  (if  COL  finks)  and, 
by  Step  5,  q(n  -  2)  +  3b -a  in  the  continuation  game,  where  n  is  the 
number  of  stages  remaining.  If  n exceeds  (2~  -  4b +  2q)/q,  then  cooperating 
is  strictly  better. 
Step  7.  .  ..the  total  number  of  stages  where  one  side  or  the  other  finks  is 
bounded  above  by 




*  1+  1  min{2-a-b,  1)  * 
As  seen  in  Step  6,  ROW  plays  Tit-for-Tat  until  stage  (2~  -  4b  +  26)/d.  If 
COL  cooperates  until  ROW  finks  and  then  finks  thereafter,  his  payoff  must 
be  at  least  N-  (2a  -  4b +  26)/d.  If  COL  finks  before  this  date,  then  in that 
stage  he gets  a.  If  he then  returns  m  stages  later  to  cooperating,  he  gets  b in 
the  stage  where  he  cooperates  and  zero  in  between.  Thus  he  gives  up 
1 +  m -a  -b  in  this  circumstance.  A  string  of  finks  costs  him 
1 +  (1 -  (a  +  b))/m  per  round  in  comparison  to  cooperating.  Thus,  each 
time  COL  finks  it  costs  him  at  least  min(2  -  a -  b,  1).  If  he  finks  k  times 
prior  to  stage  (2~  -  4b  +  26)/d,  his  payoff  cannot  exceed 
N  -  k  . min(  2 -  a -  b, 1).  These  two  bounds  on  COL’s  payoffs  yield 
k  <  (20  -  4b  +  26)/(6  -  min (2  -  a -  b,  1 {).  Each  such  act  of  finking  by 
COL  provokes  a Tit-for-Tat  response  from  ROW  in  the  next  round,  so  there 
are  at  most  2k  rounds  before  stage  (2~  -  4b +  26)/a  when  finking  occurs. 
Thus  the  maximum  number  of  rounds  with  finking  is  that  given  above. 250  KREPS  ET  AL. 
Step  8.  In  any  sequential  equilibrium  that  is  not  Pareto-dominated  by 
some  other  sequential  equilibrium,  there  is  no  finking  along  the  equilibrium 
path  when  more  than  1 +  (2a  -  4b  +  26)/a  stages  remain. 
For  any  equilibrium  where  there  is  finking  before  this  date,  a  Pareto- 
superior  equilibrium  consists  of  not  having  that  finking,  and  then  continuing 
to  play  the  game  as  if  it  had  occurred. 
Note  that  these  bounds  are  not  tight:  If  6 =  1 they  yield  n =  10 in  Step  8 
for  a =  1.5 and  b =  -  1, yet  in  this  circumstance  one  should  see finking  only 
in  the  last  period.  The  looseness  of  these  bounds  suggests  the  need for  further 
work. 
The  Tit-for-Tat  theme  can  also  be  developed  so  as  to  further  emphasize 
the  role  of  lack  of  common  knowledge.  This  development  is  in  the  spirit  of 
Milgrom  and  Roberts  14, Appendix  B]. 
Suppose  that  there  are  three  states  of  the  world.  In  state  1,  ROW  is  the 
Tit-for-Tat  player;  in  stages  2  and  3  he is  rational.  ROW  learns  whether  he 
is  Tit-for-Tat  or  not-his  information  partition  (at  the  outset)  is  { 1 },  (2,  3 ). 
COL,  on  the  other  hand,  is  given  the  information  partition  { 1, 2},  (3):  In 
state  3  he  knows  whether  ROW  is  the  Tit-for-Tat  player;  in  state  2 he  does 
not.  Suppose  that  state  3 prevails  with  very  high  probability.  Then  with  very 
high  probability,  Row  is  not  Tit-for-Tat,  and  COL  knows  that  ROW  is  not 
Tit-for-Tat.  But  ROW  is  not  sure  that  COL  knows  this,  and  one  can  show 
that  the  qualitative  results  proved  for  model  1 hold  here.  ROW  will  play  Tit- 
for-Tat  until  near  the  end  of  the  game,  hoping  that  COL  will  be “deceived.” 
And  COL  will  pretend  to  be  “deceived”  even  if  he  is  not,  as  this  improves 
his  lot  as  well. 
Or  consider  a four  state  case.  In  state  1 ROW  is  the  Tit-for-Tat  player-in 
states  2,  3  and  4  he  is  not.  ROW  is  endowed  with  the  information  partition 
{l},  (2,3},  14);  COL  with  (1,2),  (3,4).  State  4  prevails  with  probability 
close  to  one.  Then  with  probability  close  to  one,  ROW  is  not  Tit-for-Tat, 
COL  knows  that  this  is  so,  ROW  knows  that  COL  knows  this,  but  COL  is 
not  sure  that  ROW  knows  that  COL  knows.  Once  more  the  qualitative 
results  for  the  original  model  hold  up-ROW  tries  to  “deceive”  COL, 
knowing  full  well  that  COL  will  not  be  deceived  but  will  act  as  if  he is,  and 
COL  will  do  this  in the  hope  that  ROW  may  be unaware  that  is  COL  is  not 
being  deceived.  One  could  go  on  like  this  forever:  The  general  structure  is 
that  ROW’s  information  partition  should  involve  sets  {l},  (2,  3},..., 
(2m,  2m  +  l),...  and  COL’s  should  involve  { 1, 2},  {3,4}  ,...,  (2m  +  1, 
2m +  2],...  (with  termination  eventually).  The  point  is  simply  that  so  long  as 
it  is  not  common  knowledge  that  ROW  is  not  Tit-for-Tat,  cooperation  until 
near  the  end  of  the  game  will  be rational. PRISONERS’  DILEMMA  2.51 
Model  2:  Two-Sided  Uncertainty  about  the  Stage  Payoffs 
In  Model  1,  COL  entertains  a  hypothesis  about  ROW’s  behavior  that 
cannot  be  generated  if  ROW  is  rational  and  has  some  stage  game  payoffs 
that  he  sums  to  arrive  at  his  overall  payoff.  That  is,  COL’s  hypothesis,  in 
terms  of  ROW’s  “true”  utility  function,  necessarily  involves  payoffs  for 
ROW  that  cut  across  stages.  We  might  then  wonder:  Can  long-run 
cooperation  be  attained  if  the  only  alternative  hypotheses  that  are  allowed 
(besides  the  hypothesis  that  the  player  is  rational  with  the  given  stage 
payoffs)  involve  changes  in  the  stage  game  payoffs?  (This  approach  is  used 
in  [Z].)  The  answer  is  a qualified  yes. 
Suppose  that  each  player  originally  assesses  a  small  probability  that  his 
opponent  “enjoys”  cooperation  when  it  is  met  by  cooperation.  Given  our 
zero-one  normalization,  we  model  this  by  assuming  that  COL  assigns  a 
small  probability  6 >  0 that  a <  1 for  ROW,  and  ROW  entertains  a similar 
hypothesis  about  COL.  We  can  then  produce  a  sequential  equilibrium 
wherein  each  side  cooperates  until  the  last  few  stages  of  the  game,  although 
again  the  end-game  play  is  rather  complex.  In  this  equilibrium,  if  either  side 
ever  fails  to  cooperate,  then  the  other  side  takes  this  as  a sure  sign  that  the 
defector  has  stage  game  payoffs  with  a >  1,  and  the  noncooperative 
equilibrium  ensues.  As  the  details  of  this  equilibrium  are  quite  complex,  we 
refrain  from  giving  them  here.  Note,  however,  that  if  we  move  directly  to  a 
continuous-time  formulation  of  this  game,  as  in  Kreps  and  Wilson 
[ 2. Sect.  4 ], then  one  equilibrium  has  cooperation  throughout. 
There  are  two  qualifications  to  be  made.  First,  two-sided  uncertainty  is 
required.  If  ROW,  say,  is  uncertain  about  COL’s  stage  payoffs,  but  it  is 
common  knowledge  that  a  >  1  for  ROW,  then  the  only  sequential 
equilibrium  has  finking  throughout.  (This  is  true  for  any  “incomplete  infor- 
mation”  about  one  player’s  stage  payoffs.)  The  second  qualification,  and 
certainly  the  more  important,  is  that  this  game  admits  sequential  equilibria  in 
which  long-run  cooperation  does  not  ensue,  unlike  the  game  with  a Tit-for- 
Tat  possibility.  This  is  true  even  if  we  make  a  “plausibility”  restriction  on 
beliefs  off  the  equilibrium  path  in  the  spirit  of  Section  3 of  Kreps  and  Wilson 
121. Cooperation  here  requires  a  “boot-strapping”  operation:  Even  if  each 
side  is  certain  that  the  other  has  a <  1, cooperation  ensues  only  if  each  side 
hypothesizes  that  the  other  side  will  cooperate.  (This  is  a  fancy  way  of 
saying:  If  both  sides  have  payoffs  with  a <  1,  then  there  are  two  Nash 
equilibria  in  the  stage  game.)  One  might  justify  the  cooperative  equilibrium 
on  “efficiency”  grounds,  but  one  cannot  guarantee  that  cooperation  will 
prevail  in  every  sequential  equilibrium. 252  KREPS  ETAL. 
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